The Chaelundi Story The direct action in the Chaelundi old-growth forest has been quite protracted. The blockade has been protecting the forest now for over four months, the confrontation with police and the Forestry Commission only occurring in the last few weeks. This is in itself the second blockade at Chaelundi, the first being in 1990 when the Forestry Commission were first constructing their illegal road into the old growth. The current blockade (as of this writing - in mid-August), is 'on hold' while a hearing takes place in the Land & Environment court, regarding the likelihood that logging will destroy endangered species or their habitat. This would be in contravention of Section 99 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act. If the decision goes our way we will have presumably won. Otherwise it will be... Back to the forest! Tactics The fight for the forest has therefore been taking place on two main fronts. The forest blockade itself, and on the legal/political front. These tactics seem to complement each other and it is probable that neither would succeed without the other. My own involvement has been by spending a week at the action during the pre-confrontation 'wait it out' stage (which continued for over three months), and then for about ten days during the 'confrontation' stage. I know very little about the 'legal' challenge, so will not comment on it further, except to acknowledge its importance. The three and a half month of the blockade, during which there was no confrontation, was possibly critical to the success of the latter part of the blockade. During this early phase many people spent time in the forest, adding to their commitment to return when the confrontation begun. They became familiar with the area. They knew the problems associated with camping out in winter on a forest ridge about 1000m high, where the nearest accessible water was a twenty minute drive away. They knew the problems of access where the nearest town was a two hour drive mostly on dirt roads. And they knew Chaelundi was special place. When the 'pink' and 'red' alerts were issued people returned. From as far away as Perth, people made special trips to be there. The early, 'camping out in the forest' phase of the blockade also saw the construction, in considerable depth, of various forms of barriers and blockades. While all sorts of tactics were eventually used, the main barricades were: * Concrete culvert pipes, upright, half-buried, in the road with about two metres sticking out, a person chained inside. * Wooden tripods, pentapods, however-many-apods (endless variations on the theme!) constructed on, and blocking, the roadway with people aloft, sometimes chained, sometimes agile. These two tactics, and their variations, were often used in tandem, with each blocking access to the specialised machinery needed to remove the other. The 'confrontation' phase itself had about ten days when it was legal to be in the forest. The forest was then 'closed' and one could be arrested for being in the 'closed' area. During the 'open' time the police presence escalated until they were bringing in about fifty officers daily: a two hour drive on the dirt each way, each day, with many vehicles plus earth moving equipment and a cherry picker. After the 'closure' the police were forced to mount a twenty-four hour presence involving, I believe, well over a hundred officers to fill the three shifts. Great expense! This cost, in itself has highlighted some contradictions. The expense of the police operation is likely to have been considerably more than the timber is 'worth'. It has been greater than the funds required to restructure the Grafton Mill enabling it to process regrowth timber. (Which is supposedly why they 'need' to log Chaelundi old-growth in the first place.) Police Relations Relations with the police have been generally quite good, with odd exceptions, naturally enough. Protesters generally avoided abusing the police, instead continually pointing out the value of the forest, the incompetence of the Forestry Commission and the contradictions of the police having to protect them. I think too, that these good relations were considerably helped along by the attendance, in the first week, of a bush band. They played and sang on the blockades. This really lightened things up. Also the words of the songs were obviously making some of the police contemplate what they were doing. And while they had their share of 'rednecks' the police also had some who were of a 'greenish' tinge too. This ease of relations with police, as well as making the whole experience more pleasant for everyone, brought other advantages, for example, one day the police slowed right down in clearing barricades so as to allow an ABC camera crew to arrive in time to film. In my opinion this connection with police is really valuable. The forest action was reasonably successful in obtaining media attention with extensive coverage in local media. Also amongst many other things, a front-page photo/story in a Friday Sydney Morning Herald, and two visits from the ABC helicopter, all the way from Sydney. Although media interest died out somewhat with the unchanging daily tripods, the forest action certainly achieved considerable attention and has quite definitely placed Chaelundi 'on the agenda'. The later phase, where the forest was closed did allow the Forestry Commission to commence roading operations (under heavy police protection) but did not necessarily made the situation easier for the police to control. The response of the forest activists was to establish two new camps, at each end of the closed area, still with the potential to control the use of the only access road. What had been the main camp was moved a few metres back into the Guy Fawkes National Park and was continued as the home of the 'Ferals'. I was only there for the first couple of days of the 'closed' phase when communications were poor and coordination impossible. But later I heard there were coordinated actions at all three camps, blocking access to police at one end, loggers at the other, and harassment to the road-building operation by the Ferals. Now we wait upon the pleasure of the court. The Forestry Commission waits too, having been forced (by the court) to halt operations once again. It seems too early to attempt much analysis but I will just emphasise what seems to me to have been important. 1. The protracted 'non-confrontation' blockade contributed valuable preparation, experience, and the commitment of many people. 2. The blockade was very successful in holding off police and loggers for ten days, and then making it very difficult and expensive to continue even after the forest was closed. The blockade also made Chaelundi into an 'issue'. 3. The huge expense to the State of trying to log Chaelundi has highlighted contradictions about where their funding priorities lie. (Law-and-order uber alles!) This expense will undoubtably cross their minds when they consider their next foray into old-growth. 4. Police relations can be enhanced by appropriate behaviour. Music is important! 5. Even though the unchanging tactics brought on media boredom, Chaelundi's profile was raised considerably. The blockade continued to hinder 'progress' in the forest even when the media wasn't watching. 6. The 'legal' tactic and the nonviolent direct action of the blockades seem to be complementary. And I trust will eventually prove effective. Mike Holland