Social Defence, the Coup, and a Sort of Revolution:
Three days that counted for more than six years of perestroika

The attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August rightfully occupies a place
as one of the most important and unusual events of the twentieth century. 
The victory of legality has been the catalyst which has set in motion the
break-up of the Union, but it must not be forgotten that it was unarmed
civilian-based defence, not a show-down between conventional armed forces,
which won the day in Moscow on 21 August 1991.

It is not at all strange that the coup took place.  The continuing political
reforms, which were to culminate in the signing of the Union Treaty on 20
August, would have inevitably led to a fundamental weakening of the power of
the central governmental party apparatus.

It was difficult to suggest that this apparatus, which monopolised power in
the Soviet government from its first moments, would agree to relinquish
control without a fight.  Its only weapons were the powers of the government
structures: the army, KGB, and the organs of internal affairs.  As a result,
only a military coup could defend the apparatus' power.

The swift, shattering strike that came down on the conspirators seems
surprising.  By any standard of judgment the facts could not lead to the
expectation of such a quick end.

How the coup began
How did the coup begin? We have just evaluated the specific subjective
qualities of the putsch organisers who openly showed that they were morally
prepared for massive repression and rivers of blood.

It is most important to note several characteristics that defined the
initiators of the coup.  First, in case the coup was defeated, they could not
count on the mercy of the courts.  Second, it is impossible to accuse them of
insufficient ability or practical skills to carry out such a plan.  In terms
of military adventurism the Soviet government already accumulated
considerable experience.  Third, it is unthinkable to suspect that they
suffered from all excessive love of humanity or a desire to prevent bloodshed
of innocent people.  In recent years they have repeatedly demonstrated their
complete ruthlessness and cynicism in the Baltic states and the Caucasus.

Several million soldiers and the most advanced military technology were under
their control.  Any military specialist would have said that nowhere else in
the world exists the military hardware that could have finished off these
monsters in three practically bloodless days.  Such weaponry was found, and
its effectiveness was based not on some incomprehensible principle of physics
but on a social-political principle.  The principle states that no regime can
remain long in power without at least the passive support of the majority of
the population.  The weapon based on this principle is called nonviolent
social based defence.

In order to understand the sequence and logic of the events, however, we must
take into account other objective factors in the situation that the
putschists faced.  They lacked a single individual who could have been called
the leader of the coup.  Not one of the eight conspirators had gained respect
either among the civilian population or among the military.  The catastrophic
condition of the Soviet economy did not give them the luxury of completely
disregarding the opinion of the international community, on whose economic
help so much depended.  Furthermore, the vast majority of the USSR military
are conscripts, and these eighteen year old soldiers grew up in the period of
perestroika.  In addition, the officer corps of the Soviet military's active
duty units is primarily composed of Slavs.  While these officers may be
counted on in the non-Slavic regions, their reliability to act against a
peaceful population in Moscow or Leningrad becomes not so assured.

The main danger for the putschists came from the RSFSR Parliament or "White
House", the tall white building on the banks of the Moscow River which houses
the power structure of the Russian Federation and President Boris Yeltsin and
his administration.  When the conspirators found the building defended by
hundreds of armed and professionally trained security forces they worked out
a detailed plan - providing for the killing of the twelve most senior Russian
politicians - to storm it.

In order to provide even the most minimal legitimacy to this operation, it
was necessary to first announce the accession of the new power.  Referring
immediately to the malicious disobedience and violation of the emergency
situation on the part of the Russian leadership, they would have somehow
justified the victims during the storming of the White House.

To accomplish this measure the putschists first seized control of the media
and communications which were immediately deployed for a massive propaganda
campaign.  But six years of glasnost and perestroika taught people to
separate truth from lies.  In the first several hours thousands of
demonstrators gathered at the White House and surrounded it with a dense
human ring. The conspirators had not provided for this response. They had
expected the response of previous years when the people, who, if not overly
delighted, at least tolerated changes in the political course of the Soviet
leadership.

The Alpha team and the bloodbath that never happened
Now the problem was more complicated and acquired a more subtle character. 
On the way to the White House the aggressors had provoked a small number of
armed forces and a crowd of unarmed civilians.  Retreat was impossible.  As
Boris Yeltsin later stated in a television interview, the order had been made
"to sweep the people off the streets".  The leadership would then report that
the victims were a consequence of "wide-scale provocation by extremist
elements" and hooliganism by "outraged groups."  Such a press report had
already been prepared by the military.

A special section of the "KGB Department for the Struggle against Terrorism",
code-named Alpha, was given direct responsibility for the operation.  Plans
were carefully worked out, and the troops were equipped with the most
powerful, state-of-the-art weapons, including grenades and anti-tank devices.
But when it was explained that in the process, the men would have to kill
several hundreds or perhaps thousands of unarmed civilians, the entire
subdivision refused to carry out the order despite the consequences to
themselves.

Until this moment everything had gone according to the putschists' plan. But
for the first time, the weapon of nonviolent opposition appeared, and in this
case it demoralized the opposition.  Such unarmed resistance proved to be the
greatest asset to the defenders of the White House.

The conspirators fully understood that time was of the essence.  The
continued existence of the Russian government, which immediately used its
widespread popularity to assume responsibility for coordinating the
democratic opposition, represented a fatal threat to the junta.  There was no
time to re-educate the rebellious unit.  In Moscow, substitutes were called
up from the KGB special forces, who, according to specialists, were real
zombies capable of fulfilling any order.  But time was lost, and the Russian
government had already demonstrated its capability.  Peoples' Deputies
located inside the White House maintained constant contact with the
demonstrators.  People saw that they were defending more than just bricks and
mortar.  This realisation provided a moral justification and added to the
strength of the defenders.

Digging in and preparing backups
A back-up government was immediately formed by the White House.  By the
second day, they already began to fulfil their duties from an underground
bunker near the city of Sverdlovsk, kilometres from Moscow.  In addition,
they were working on the creation abroad of a Russian government-in-exile. 
These measures fundamentally devalued the meaning of the capture of the White
House itself, and forced the putschists further to slow their operations.  In
these efforts, another method of nonviolent opposition became crystal clear:
the organisation of parallel reserve structures of power.

The first victory provided impetus to the mass opposition movement.  In this
situation the Russian government occupied an extremely distinct and skillful
position.  The central message of its edicts and appeals was the total
illegality of the junta and the complete refusal to use any form of violence.
Following Yeltsin's call for a general strike a series of organisations in
many regions of the country stopped work on the very next day.  This happened
in spite of a total blockade of independent means of mass communication and
the officially announced prohibition of strikes.

Employees of banned media outlets behaved courageously.  For instance, in
Moscow, employees of eleven banned newspapers united to publish a "general
newspaper" printed on photocopying and duplicating machines.  Large
quantities of issues of this newspaper as well as copies of the Russian
President's orders and appeals were pasted to the walls and cars of the
metro, at bus stops, and other gathering places.  This was important not only
in order to spread accurate information.  All over town large groups of
people gathered around the posted papers and exchanged opinions about recent
events.  It had a great psychological impact and added a special mood to the
city.  The quantity of signs was so great that any attempt to tear them down
would have seemed funny and stupid.

Occupations and soldiers' strikes
Other forms of nonviolent action, such as the surrounding and occupation of
government buildings and organisations, were also used.  One hundred and one
students of the Moscow Military Institute of the Ministry of Defence
barricaded themselves in their barracks and declared their unwillingness to
participate in the overthrow of the government.

For Muscovites, mingling with soldiers entering the city provided another
very important type of nonviolent action.  Spontaneous meetings took place
around military vehicles and tanks.  No one displayed a personal hatred for
the soldiers.  They gave the soldiers cigarettes and brought food.  The
attitude of goodwill, and the imparting of otherwise unavailable information,
put paid to the "fighting spirit" of the conscripts.  Such action created the
necessity for a constant rotation of military units patrolling the city. 
Units which had been persuaded by the local population not to engage in
repression were taken out and replaced with fresh arrivals.

Building barricades - and the tide begins to turn
Barricades were built from trolley buses, delivery trucks, and rubbish skips.
Of course, they did not present serious obstacles to armoured vehicles, but
they were completely capable of stopping opponents if only for a few minutes.
These minutes could be used to agitate among the soldiers.  Protesters who
spoke the languages of non-Russian nationalities were selected in order to
appeal to soldiers in their native tongue while the tanks attempted to storm
the barricades.  As a result of these discussions, six tanks ordered to seize
the White House defected to the Russian side.  They hung Russian flags on
their antennas turned their gun turrets 180 degrees away from the White
House.

Moscow's response to the announcement of a curfew was significant.  On the
night of 20-21 August when the curfew was officially imposed, there were no
fewer people than usual on the Moscow streets after 11pm.  Public transport
continued to operate.  An outside observer would never have suspected that a
curfew was in force.  This collective act of insubordination by Muscovites
may well have been the decisive psychological factor that demonstrated to the
putschists the futility of their efforts to bring "order" to the country.  We
can only speculate.  At the very least, 20 August was the junta's last night.

Today, some people have been joking that what we need to do is not to bring
the conspirators to trial, but to make monuments to them.  In just three days
they secured the construction of fundamental political change in the country
which the democrats had been unable to achieve in six years of perestroika. 
In that case, they deserve further recognition.  No one before them succeeded
so persuasively and graphically to demonstrate the effectiveness of
nonviolent social based defence.
Alexander Pronozin
From Peace News, September 1991