Where To From Here? The Latest Developments In Robert Burrowes' War Tax Resistance Campaign The Petition for Bankruptcy. Since last March, when the Australian Taxation Office issued a 'Bankruptcy Notice' against Robert Burrowes, there has been a long waiting period for the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation to make the next move. Robert has been refusing to pay part of his taxes in 'legal tender' (as stipulated by Regulation 58 made pursuant to the Tax Act 1966) because he does not want to contribute to military expenditure. Instead he has attempted to pay 'in kind' with such constructive and symbolic items as shovels, trees and Aboriginal land (see NVT no.11, p.21 and no.20, pp.13-14) and by donating the balance of the claimed money to various peace and development organisations. In late October a leaked internal Taxation Office document stated that most branch offices were not pursuing tax debts of less than $10,000. The official response was that this was untrue, although those owing smaller amounts were pursued with less vigour than those owing large amounts. Whatever the truth of these reports they may illustrate a dilemma for the tax office. If the taxation officials really were not going to chase minor debtors, Robert would be overlooked and unnecessary publicity that may encourage others to take similar actions would be avoided. On the other hand if they proceed to bankrupt him regardless of the inevitable media coverage, even though the amounts owing are less than $10,000 (and half of that being court costs and interest, not withheld taxes), it may ensure that others get the message that such actions will not be tolerated. They chose the latter option. On 9 October, Robert was finally served with a 'Creditor's Petition' (see NVT no.23, p.13) informing him that the petition by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation to have him declared bankrupt would be heard in the Federal Court in Melbourne on 7 November. It seemed that a long period of waiting was finally coming to an end. After being assured that the petition would be heard on the set day, Robert and his support team mobilised the media to ensure good coverage of the courtroom action. With many well-wishers and a large media contingent present, Robert walked into the Federal Court with his now familiar shovel, tree and Land Rights flag only to be informed that the Taxation Office was requesting a three week adjournment to gather more information to fight the case. They have already had over two years since Robert was ordered to pay up by the Magistrates' Court in 1989, to prepare. This raised the question of whether the media could be mobilised again so soon. The Case in the Federal Court Although many of Robert's usual supporters were in Canberra protesting against the AIDEX 'Arms Bazaar', the media were again present in force at 9.30am outside the Federal Court building to hear Robert tell them that not only did he not want to kill anyone but that he did not want to pay anyone else to do the killing for him, and to film him entering the building with his usual paraphernalia. The morning was taken up with other matters, but finally, at 12.40 pm, Judge Heerey undertook to hear the case Re Robert J.Burrowes; ex parte the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. After the barrister for the Tax Office had outlined the decision of the 1989 Magistrates' Court, the learned judge adjourned the proceedings until 2.30pm after the lunch break. Fortunately no other important story was breaking in Melbourne and the patient media returned after lunch. Robert was allowed to speak, uninterrupted, seemingly for as long as he wanted. He outlined three grounds for his conscientious belief: 1. Ten years engaged in peace research had provided the intellectual justification for his strengthening belief that military spending benefits vested interests and has very little to do with the security needs of the vast majority of people. 2. His personal experience in Sudanese refugee camps during the Ethiopian famine and as a member of the Gulf Peace Team brought home to him the development and environmental costs of military spending. 3. His personal philosophy of a commitment to nonviolence as a way of life was based on a belief in the sacredness and interconnectedness of all life. Then he presented the five legal grounds on which he intended to argue his case: 1. That the taxes have been paid. 2. That the taxes are not required to be paid because they are a violation of his right to freedom of conscience under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Australia is a signatory. 3. The taxes are not required to be paid because they are a violation of the legal duty under international law as exemplified in the Nuremburg Principles. 4. The taxes are not required to be paid because they are used for illegal purposes in contravention of numerous treaties of international law which Australia has ratified. 5. The 'necessity defence', which excuses criminal action if it is done to prevent an 'imminent peril', obviates the necessity to pay taxes because this course of action will help to prevent the 'imminent peril' of nuclear holocaust. The Decision of the Federal Court The prosecution case was a re-run of the argument presented in the Magistrates' court two years earlier: the amounts were not in dispute, the grounds Robert was basing his case on were not recognised in the Tax Act, taxes had to be paid in 'legal tender', and that the Federal Court had no power to make judgments on constitutional matters so grounds 2-5 were irrelevant. The decision of the court was also a re-run of the earlier ruling. Following a few statements about Robert's sincerity and the courteous way he had presented his case the judge (accurately) summarised each of the legal grounds Robert had put up in defence, and then dismissed them in a few sentences: Regulation 58 insists on 'legal tender', international covenants are not part of Australia's domestic law, the Nuremburg Principles do not seem to be applicable to actions of individual taxpayers under the Tax Act, international treaties are not part of Australia's domestic law, the law of necessity is only relevant as a defence to criminal charges and does not extend to cover taxation matters. Judge Heerey announced that he had no option but to find against Robert's grounds for challenging the petition, consequently he directed that a sequestration order be made against Robert. Robert Burrowes was now officially a bankrupt. Given this seeming predicability of outcome, one is left wondering whether it is inevitable in our legal system and, whether it is or not, if it is worth putting any amount of quality time into fighting tax resistance cases in this forum. Where to From Here? In his verdict the judge made the expected point that we elect governments that control parliament and make laws (that some may conscientiously object to) for societal good. The system of democratic government, he continued, means that we live under the rule of law and that laws must be enforceable. Individuals do not have the choice to disobey the law because they contradict a conscientious belief, no matter how sincerely held. The unstated implication is: if you don't like the law elect a different government. Can anyone seriously imagine a Hewson government introducing a bill allowing for a diversion of war tax? This certainly is not the answer. In his statement, Robert asked the judge to put legal fictions aside and not make his judgment on sterile interpretations of the law, to be creative, to use his imagination to bring down a decision which would serve to make a more just and peaceful world. Robert asked Judge Heerey not to try to find the answer to the matter before him in the usual 'box', because it was not there. He urged the judge to open other 'boxes'. The barrister for the Tax Office immediately went to the same old 'box' and neither he nor the judge even looked in the direction of another. And, given the working of the system, it is almost inevitable that this is the way it is destined to be. This then raises the question of what exactly the aim of this type of action is. Where the discourses are so fundamentally different should the aim continue to be an attempted victory in court, or should effort be put into educating the public through the media which in turn may eventually tempt government to pass Jo Vallentine's war tax diverting Peace Trust Fund Bill or incorporate broader definitions of conscientious objection and international conventions into our domestic law? The Fight for Genuine Security The public education route is the easier one. The Cold War has cooled right off. There is much talk of peace dividends. Famines and 'natural' disasters have not decreased and so now it is easier to make an impact by noting how many schools, hospitals or wells could be constructed from the cost of each fighter plane or battle ship. Increasingly global security must be seen in terms of environmental security for all and social justice for the many denied it. If the role of governments is to provide security for their citizens, how, in a time of minimal international tension, is this achieved by arms spending while citizens starve and are without shelter? Perhaps we should pay taxes for the security of people - but in the international, not just the national, community. And for the majority of people security surely means more than merely the protection of an elite by military force. The hegemonic notion of what defence and security entails needs to be broken. Fighting war tax resistance battles helps in this regard. Are Court Battles Useful in the Legal Sense? Although Robert had to abandon his High Court challenge of the Tax Act because it became increasingly clear that the legal system is structured in a way as to preclude such challenges to state authority, perhaps there is a (slight) possibility of a breakthrough in this forum. During his trial for sedition in 1922, Mahatma Gandhi told the judge: "I am here to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen. The only course open to you...is...either to resign your post, or inflict on me the severest penalty if you believe that the system and the law you are assisting to administer are good for the people of this country and that my activity is therefore injurious to the public weal." A rare judge may have realised that imperialist exploitation was unjust and they were upholders of an iniquitous system. Within our liberal democracy a judge can always blame a popularly elected parliament for laws she or he merely has to interpret. There will never be resignations and very rarely will creatively novel decisions be handed down. But occasionally courts will make a quantum directional change. All students of law know that until sixty years ago when Mrs.Donoghue found the partially decomposed snail in her bottle of half drunk ginger beer and suffered nervous shock as a result, there was no adequate law of negligence. This is the classic example of judge, rather than parliament, made law. If there was the single minded will (and unlimited funds) to keep appealing on the grounds that international treaties are part of our domestic law perhaps one day a break through could be achieved. As with the need to call errant manufacturers to book for their negligence with the emergence of a mass consumer market, perhaps, in an era of a shrinking world where the nation state looks more and more anachronistic, the time is approaching when global and conscience considerations are given far greater importance in our domestic legal system. Perhaps it's time for another snail in the ginger beer. But that would take creative and imaginative judges. Conclusion Whichever path is taken, it seems that the tactics remain roughly the same. A vigorous court statement, and the backing of sympathetic lawyers, may one day provide a legal breakthrough. In any case, through the media and public sympathy, the courts can be used to bring pressure on government to alter laws dealing with security, conscience and the interrelationship between domestic and international legal systems. As Robert Burrowes awaits the Trustee to attempt to take over management of his financial affairs, the answer to the question, "Where to from here?" seems to be (at least after he is discharged from bankruptcy in three years time) 'more of the same'. Regardless of court decisions or changes in public and parliamentary attitudes to war tax resistance, what other choice does a conscientious objector have? Thomas Weber