An Anti-Coup Defense: Prerequisite for a Lasting Democracy A lecture in the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, 5 November 1992. Introduction Supporters of political democracy and social justice have good reasons to be alarmed about coups d'etat. Coups have overthrown established constitutional democratic systems of government, halted movements toward greater democracy, and stopped progress toward social justice. Coups d'etat are one of the main ways in which new dictatorships are established. Coups are a major unsolved defense problem. Coups d'etat have taken place in dozens of countries in nearly every region of the world in recent decades. Coups have been most often conducted by sections of the military forces, often acting alone or in alliance with other groups. Sometimes coups have been executive usurpations: an established president or prime minister, for example, falsely claiming an emergency, acts to establish a dictatorship. Sometimes coups have been made by a dictatorial political party, with or without its own paramilitary forces. When coups have occurred, supporters of political freedom have often been silent and have passively submitted. They often did not know what else to do, as the usual constitutional procedures are useless against those prepared to violate them. The possibility of launching a civil war against the military forces and their allies - a war which democrats would certainly lose has inspired few. Without serious anti-coup preparations, a lasting democratic system is very doubtful, especially in countries with a history of coups. This is true regardless of the current political situation and public statements of innocent intentions by the groups which are able to attempt a coup. Coups have been defeated, and therefore can be defeated Despite devastating conditions, civilians have at times been able to block illegal seizures of state power. The defeat of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 is the most recent case. Prominent earlier similar cases of successful anti-coup defense occurred in Germany in 1920 against the Kapp Putsch (which threatened the new Weimar Republic) and in France in 1961 against the Algiers generals' revolt (which aimed to keep Algeria French by ousting the de Gaulle-Debre government). In these three cases, and a few others, the coups were blocked by internal nonviolent resistance. Only occasionally has serious supportive international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken. However, as the current case in Haiti suggests, successful defense against coups primarily depends on noncooperation and defiance within the attacked country, not on foreign opposition. These examples of successful anti-coup defense prove that coups can be defeated without civil war. Anti-coup defense can be waged by the attacked society itself. Establishment and consolidation of control can be blocked In a coup d'etat, the seizure of government buildings, transportation and communication centres, and key geographical points, and even the arrest and execution of government officials, are not done for their own sake. Rather, the purpose of those seizures is to control the state apparatus, and hence the country as a whole. The putschists must secure that broad control if the coup is to be successful. A coup does not immediately give the putschists the control they need, however. They will not initially control the population, political, economic, or social organizations, or governmental structures, nor even all of the military forces and the police. The need to consolidate control - and the time it takes to effect this - makes an effective defense by the society possible. The Putschists require... Immediately after the coup is started, the putschists require legitimacy, that is, acceptance of their moral and political right, or authority, to rule. Endorsements by moral and religious leaders, respected political personages, and in some cases royalty or past officials, will help them to gain that acceptance. The first basic principle of anti-coup defense is therefore to deny legitimacy to the putschists. The putschists also require that the civilian leaders and population be either supportive, confused, or just passive. The putschists require the cooperation of specialists and advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators and judges to consolidate their control over the affected society. Journalists and broadcasters, printers and technicians, will be required to do as they are told. Police, prison officials, and soldiers will be required to follow orders to make arrests, jail protesters, impose repression, and execute people as commanded. The putschists also require that a multitude of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions, and the economy will passively submit and carry out their usual functions as modified by the putschists' orders and policies. The putschists require that their control of the state apparatus be accepted by the persons and institutions of the society and government in whom moral and legitimate political authority reside, whether they be elected officials, unofficial moral leaders, or royalty. The Putschists' requirements may be denied Legitimacy and cooperation are, however, not automatic. They may be jeopardized by repudiation, noncooperation and defiance. Even moderate opposition may force the attackers to make significant efforts to seek the needed acceptance, cooperation, and support. Strong, determined, and widespread rejection of the coup d'etat by the society can block the putschists' objectives and thereby defeat the coup. The second basic principle of anti-coup defense is to resist the putschists with noncooperation and defiance. If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the putsch may die of political starvation. Anti-coup defense by an assertive citizenry can be greatly strengthened by specific preparations and guidelines. These guidelines would aim to prepare the citizenry and social institutions to offer collective resistance to any coup. What steps can be taken in this direction? Among them are - * Governments and other societal institutions can adopt a "civilian-based defense" policy to deter and defeat coups d'etat, that is, prepared noncooperation and defiance against such attacks. * Laws can be enacted making it a legal obligation of all citizens to refuse to obey, serve, or collaborate with any unconstitutional seizure of the state apparatus. This should be accompanied by a national campaign to educate the whole population on this principle. * Legal and constitutional provisions can be adopted making it an obligation of all elected, appointed, and hereditary government personnel to refuse to recognize all persons and groups which have attempted to seize control of the government by a coup d'etat. * Specific obligations and guidelines for anti-coup resistance would be developed for and by civil servants, media staff, communications operators, police, military forces, and employees of local, regional and provincial governments. The Civilian Defenders' Aims In a powerful anti-coup defense, the population would prevent the attackers' control of the state apparatus and the country by massive and selective noncooperation, while maintaining their support for the legal government and its call to resist. Under such a policy the civilian defenders will aim to - * Repudiate the putschists as illegitimate with no rightful claim to become the government * Make the attacked society unrulable by the attackers * Block the imposition of viable government by the putschists * Maintain control and self direction of their own society * Make the institutions of the society into omnipresent resistance organizations against a coup * Deny to the putschists any additional objective beyond political control * Make the costs of the attack and attempted domination unacceptable * Subvert the reliability and loyalty of the putschists' troops and functionaries and induce them to desert their mutinous officers * Encourage dissension and opposition among the putschists' supporters * Stimulate international opposition to the coup by diplomatic, economic, and public opinion pressures against the attackers * Achieve international support in communications, finances, food, diplomacy, and other resources. Direct Defense of the Society, Not Buildings This anti-coup policy, it should be noted, is focused on defense of the society by the society itself, not on defense of points of geography or even governmental buildings. Those points of geography or buildings are ultimately important to coup leaders only when possession of them is accompanied by the assistance of related people and institutions. Control of a parliament building itself gives no control over the actual members of parliament or over the population as a whole that believes in parliamentary government. The priorities of action here are crucial. Insistence on abiding by constitutional procedures or the maintenance of a free press, for example, are of more direct importance to democracy than possession of a given street intersection or building. It is of course true that on occasion certain sites and buildings have a special symbolic importance. In 1991, for example, both the Lithuanian parliament building and the Russian 'White House" were so protected by people power. One should not generalize too widely from these two cases, however. If the putschists are uncertain of their own intentions and methods, or if their troops are unwilling to kill many of the defenders, then a defense by human barricades may be successful. However, a serious danger exists in attempts to defend key buildings or other sites by human barricades. If, despite the defenders' efforts, the building is successfully seized by the putschists, the defenders and general population may become unjustifiably demoralized. The defenders may then believe, not that only the parliament building has been seized, but that parliament itself been destroyed. The defenders and population may believe that the mere physical occupation of the former government headquarters has put the putschists in control. Such a situation must be avoided. Transpartisan Acceptance and Participation Both prior to and following adoption of the civilian-based anti-coup policy, a widespread education program and public discussions should take place about the potential of the policy and the broad guidelines for its implementation. While support for anti-coup defense should not be expected from the clique intent on conducting a coup, the consideration and adoption of an anti-coup defense policy will be strengthened if it receives widespread consideration, support, and participation from persons and groups with various political opinions. They need only agree that changes of government should take place by constitutionally determined procedures and not by coups d'etat backed by threat or use of military might. Given that type of support the anti-coup policy will likely be stronger and more united. Resistance: General and Organized Strategies of anti-coup defense might be grouped initially into two broad categories, general and organized. Well in advance of an attack, a number of key points would be selected and identified to the general population as points at which the population should resist, even in the absence of any specific instructions from a leadership group. This type of resistance is called general resistance. These points might include, for example, attempts to replace constitutional officials with new personnel or to turn elected officials into dictatorial usurpers, efforts to promote the attackers' regime as legitimate, attempts to remake or abolish the elected legislature, measures to remake the courts impose a new constitution, abridgements of the freedom of speech and religion, and efforts to control the society's independent institutions. Infringement by the attackers on any of these points would be the population's signal to resist, even if communications from the legitimate officials or the initial defense leaders have been blocked or they have been arrested or executed. In organized resistance the defenders act in accordance with specific instructions from a leadership group, such as officials of the legitimate government or representatives of voluntary organizations (educational, civic, labor, religious, political, and others). Organized resistance would supplement, not replace, general resistance. Often, organized resistance would consist of acts which focus on a specific event or occur in a specific place or at a designated time. Such resistance may take the form of specific acts of symbolic protests or resistance, of which there are dozens of possible types. The Importance of Strategy The general technique which has been most effective in anti-coup defense is nonviolent struggle. This avoids fighting the putschists with military weapons, with which the usurpers usually have the advantage. The nonviolent technique also maximizes the power of the defenders, vastly increases the possible number of resisters over those able and willing to use violence, and very importantly helps to undermine the morale and reliability of the putschists' soldiers. The weapons, or methods, of nonviolent struggle applied in civilian-based defense such as strikes, boycotts, types of political noncooperation, and mutiny are not to be applied randomly. These methods should not be selected in accordance with the whims of individuals or in response to incidental events, nor should they be applied in a hodgepodge, improvised, or intuitive way. These methods instead will be most effective if they are applied as component parts of a comprehensive, carefully chosen strategy of anti-coup defense. Strategies for anti-coup defense need to be planned with much thought and extreme care. The strategies need to draw upon the best available resources about strategic principles. They also need to be based on knowledge of nonviolent struggle, the dynamics of coups, the particular conflict situation, and the strengths and weaknesses of both the defending population and the putschists. Guidelines for Anti-Coup Defense Specific guidelines for anti-coup general resistance against coups can be formulated which would constitute basic elements for an effective anti-coup strategy and would also be specific instructions on how to resist. They could include the following: * Repudiate the coup and denounce its leaders as illegitimate, meriting only rejection as a government. * Moral, political, and religious leaders; officials; and members in all of the society's institutions (including education, the media, and communications) should denounce the putschists. * Refuse to give any legitimacy to the putschists by any means, including efforts to negotiate a compromise between them and the legitimate political leaders. * Regard all decrees and orders from the putschists contradicting established law as illegal, and disobey them. * Keep all resistance strictly nonviolent in order to make the anti-coup defense the most effective possible. * Refuse to be provoked into violent or otherwise imprudent action. * Refuse and disobey all attempts by the putschists to establish and extend controls over the governmental apparatus and society. * Noncooperate with the putschists in all ways. This would apply to the general population; all political leaders and all branches of the central (or federal), state, regional, and local governments, including civil servants and bureaucrats; key occupational and professional groups; media and communications workers; all staff of transportation systems; the police; members and units of the military forces; all judges and employees of the judicial system; the staffs of all financial institutions, both governmental and private; and officers and members of all other institutions of the society. * Persist in maintaining the pre-coup operations of the society in accordance with the pre-attack constitution, laws, and policies. This should be continued until and unless the defenders are physically removed from their work places, offices, and activity centers. Even then as far as possible, continue normal operations from other locations. This would apply especially to officials and employees of all branches, departments and levels of government. * Preserve the functioning of legitimate political and social organizations. Create backup organizations which may need to assume the functions of organizations attacked or closed down by the putschists. * Refuse to supply vital information to the putschists and their helpers. Remove road signs, street names, traffic signs, house numbers, etc., when appropriate to stall the putschists' activities and protect people from arrest. * Refuse to supply the putschists with needed supplies and equipment, hiding them when appropriate. * Engage in friendly "creative communication" with the functionaries and troops serving the putschists while continuing resistance. Explain to them the reasons for the defense struggle, affirm the absence of any intended violence against them, seek to undermine their reliability, and try to induce them to be helpful to the defenders or even to desert the putschists and join the defenders' nonviolent defense. Both de Gaulle's appeal to French soldiers in 1961 and the appeals of the popular resisters in Moscow in 1991 to soldiers and tank crews were of this type. * Refuse to assist the putschists in propaganda dissemination. * Document in writing, sound, and film the putschists' activities and repression. Preserve the documentation and also distribute the information widely to the defenders, internationally, and to the putschists' supporters. Other Types of Preparations Besides preparation and dissemination of such general guidelines for anti-coup resistance, several other types of preparations for defense are possible. Provisions and equipment would be required for communications after the putschists had occupied key centers and seized facilities of established newspapers and radio and television stations. Publishing and broadcasting equipment for underground newspapers, resistance leaflets, and underground radio could be obtained and hidden for use in emergencies. Treatment of the Usurpers' Troops and Functionaries In response to the initial putsch, the defenders would attempt to communicate with and to warn the putschists, their functionaries, and their troops about the population's hostility to the attack. Words and symbolic actions would be used to communicate the will to resist, to show the type of defense which would be waged, and to urge the putschists to withdraw. Efforts would be made at all phases of the putsch to undermine the loyalty of the putschists' individual soldiers and functionaries. The soldiers would initially be informed that there will be resistance but that the resistance will be of a special type. In this resistance, the defense would indeed be directed against the putschists' attempt to seize control but would be conducted without harming them as individuals. Strong resistance without personal threat or violence may, at least among some soldiers, create or aggravate morale problems. There can be no guarantee, however, that the putschists' troops will be favorably affected, especially in the short run. They may still perpetrate brutalities and kill nonviolent resisters. Such tragedies do not, however, mean the failure of the resistance. Instead, given continued, disciplined resistance, brutalities can weaken the putschists and strengthen the defense struggle. The shock effect of the brutalities can at times increase the numbers of resisters and strengthen their determination, sow doubts and reservations in the minds of the putschists' troops and other supporters, and arouse stronger international opposition to the coup. Facing Attack: A First Strategy of Repudiation and Rejection In the first hours, days, and weeks after a coup d'etat is attempted, it is extremely important to take quick and solid action to block the putschists from establishing effective control over the state apparatus and the society. That strategy would combine repudiation of claims to legitimacy and refusal of cooperation and total or near total noncooperation with the putschists. An early defeat of the coup would make unnecessary a later long-term struggle with an entrenched and therefore much stronger oppressive regime. Because coup attempts are generally at their weakest point in the first hours and days, it is vital that anti-coup defenders undertake immediate and resolute action against the attackers. The defense must be broad and deep enough in the society to constitute a resolute repudiation of the putschists. The attackers' appeals for national unity (supporting them) and to allow them time to prove their good intentions must be dismissed. International Support Sometimes international support can be influential in assisting anti-coup struggles. Some of it can be planned in advance. By advance international arrangements or independent decisions, other governments could refuse diplomatic recognition of the putschists and declare a prohibition on economic aid, as the United States and other countries did in reaction to the 1991 Soviet coup attempt. Such governments and societies could also provide technical and economic assistance; publishing, radio, and television services; and telecommunications support to the civilian defenders. The nonviolent and defiant character of the "people power" resistance may stimulate much international publicity and sympathy. At times that may lead to diplomatic and international economic pressures against the putschists. However, there should be no romanticism that international public opinion or even international diplomatic and economic pressure can defeat a coup without determined and strong defense by the attacked society itself. Defying Repression and Intimidation Putschists facing strong and well prepared anti-coup defense are likely to be seriously threatened and therefore may respond with repression. However, in themselves the repressive measures are not decisive unless they invoke fear and submissiveness in the defenders. In fact, the opponents' repression is evidence of the power of the nonviolent struggle and is no more reason for despair than if, in a military war, the enemy shoots back, wounding and killing one's own soldiers. Nonviolent defiance often risks serious casualties, but it seems to produce far fewer casualties than when both sides use violence. At the same time, persistence in nonviolent struggle contributes to much greater chance for success than if the resisters had chosen to fight a militarily prepared opponent with violence. The Importance of Nonviolent Discipline Recognizing that violence underlines the dynamics and strength of nonviolent resistance, the putschists may often deliberately seek to provoke the resisters to use violence. Violence or violent intentions may be falsely attributed to resisters. Repression, particularly brutal repression, may be intended to provoke the resisters into a violent response. At other times, agents provocateurs are placed within resistance groups to instigate or even commit acts of violence in order to support the charge that the resisters are using violence. All these provocations must be resisted if the defenders do not want to undermine their own defense. Maintenance of nonviolent resistant behavior by the anti-coup defenders is likely to contribute to (1) winning sympathy and support, (2) reducing casualties, (3) inducing disaffection and mutiny of the opponent' troops, and (4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle. Nonviolent discipline is a key factor in achieving these aims. A Durable Victory Victory with this anti-coup policy will come only to those who have developed it into a refined and powerful political tool operating with a wise strategy. Defeat of the civilian defenders is always possible, just as defeat occurs in traditional war. However, there are strong signs that a determined people will have far greater chances of achieving success with this type of a civilian-based anti-coup policy than with a military struggle, and with fewer casualties and less destruction. Great care will then be needed in the transition back to the constitutional system, especially if former political leaders have been killed by the putschists. If the civilian defenders maintain their discipline and persist despite repression, and if they involve significant sections of the populace, the putschists' drive to achieve their aims can be frustrated and finally blocked. When a society is known to have a well prepared anti-coup defense, would-be usurpers anticipating at best a very hard struggle and at worst an ignominious defeat may never even attempt a coup. The civilian-based anti-coup defense thereby can have deterrent effect. This policy is a creative defense based on the power of people even in grave crises to become, and remain, the masters of their own destinies. The consequences of this could be profound for Thailand and for the world. Gene Sharp from Civilian-Based Defense, December 1992. Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion A ten page newsletter containing theoretical articles, book reviews and world news - all relating to developments in the consideration of nonviolent, civilian-based defense in various parts of the world. Six issues per year: $15, postage paid. Write to: Civilian-Based Defense Association, 154 Auburn St, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.