Forest Campaigns
A Case Study of East Gippsland 1993-1994

During 1993 an alliance of environmental groups - including the Friends of
the Earth Forest Network (FOE), The Wilderness Society (TWS) and the
Concerned Residents of East Gippsland (CROEG) - was formed in order to
conduct a campaign to save the remaining old-growth forests of East Gippsland
from being woodchipped. After attending an information night on 12 September
and talking to several people involved in the campaign, I accepted an
invitation to conduct nonviolent action workshops at the East Gippsland
Forest Alliance (EGFA) festival which was held at Goongerah in far eastern
Victoria between 26-29 November 1993.

Given my interest in this campaign but well aware that I had not been
involved in developing it, I decided to confine my role to conducting these
workshops and to listening/observing. As it transpired, I also conducted a
workshop designed to allow (mainly new) activists to emotionally prepare
themselves for the first action of the campaign - a large forest rally - on
29 November. I also conducted emotional debriefing workshops after this
action. Each of these forums provided me with excellent opportunities to
listen to many people who attended the festival and protest. As a result of
participating in these forums and listening carefully during my five days at
Base Camp - and based on my experience in four previous forest campaigns - I
noted many points of interest for those who are involved in planning
campaigns of this nature.

I observed many good points about this campaign. These included the clarity
of definition of its political objectives, its organisation of the festival,
and its outreach (there were about 400 people at the festival including a
large contingent from north-east New South Wales). Nevertheless, there were
several ways in which the campaign might have been improved and I made a list
of constructive suggestions in a letter written to EGFA's Strategy Collective
- the main organising group. Using the EGFA experience to illustrate the
discussion, I will raise several points which future campaigns of a similar
nature might consider.

Camp Safety
The Camp was not considered safe by many women and some men, particularly
those who were new to this type of activity. The major concerns that I heard
expressed related to: 1. Sexual harassment around the Camp, 2. the
male-dominated group process at Camp meetings, 3. the 'ruthless' manner in
which some ideas (for example, the suggestion that the kitchen be moved
upstream as one way of solving the hygiene problems related to washing and
water collection) were dealt with, and 4. the inadequate processes for
allowing people to deal with their anxieties and fears (for example, in
relation to the potential for activist, worker or police violence) prior to
and following the action on 29 November.

For Camps of this nature, the following suggestions seem appropriate: 1.
Create a Women's Space in the Camp, 2. initiate discussion at the first Camp
meeting designed to lead to a Camp agreement that people will not engage in
sexual harassment, 3. modify the group process at large Camp meetings as
indicated in the next section, and 4. ensure that appropriate forums in which
people can discuss their anxieties and fears both before and after actions
(for example, emotional debriefing workshops) are organised.

Structure and decision-making process in the camp
Despite the many efforts made to include the ideas of those outside the
Strategy Collective, there were several points about the EGFA structure and
decision-making process in the Camp which served to exclude them. This made
it particularly difficult for new people to get involved. The main problems -
and possible remedies for the future - include the following.

Firstly, the Camp meeting process was new to many people and, for that reason
alone, difficult to use efficiently. This led to some inappropriate
behaviours, some very long meetings and much frustration. There are several
things which can be done in this context. 1. The facilitation of camp
meetings could be 'tighter' (rather than 'too patient') and shared more
(among experienced facilitators). In addition, use could be made of
blackboards and charts so that progress in any discussion is recorded and
displayed publicly, 2. the practice of consensus decision-making (a process
in which people 'stand aside' when nothing fundamental is at stake) could be
explained more thoroughly and taught in group process workshops, 3. people
who arrive late at meetings and ask a question dealt with previously could be
asked to consult the person next to them so that the meeting is not held up,
4. there could be more attempt (with appropriate explanation) to 'crack down'
on repetition (usually by men who have not been listening), and 5. more
effort could be made to utilise small groups.

In my experience, people respect 'tightly' facilitated meetings provided that
they understand what is happening and why. This also helps to stem the drift
of people away from longer meetings.

Secondly, there appeared to be tension in the Strategy Collective between
those who seemed concerned about 'hanging on' to their own power and those
who were more inclined to involve 'outside' people. In any case, there seemed
to be little sense of how to exploit the collective experience of the
Strategy Collective while utilising the talents of the many other people who
were in the Camp. This had some interesting outcomes. For example, at the
action planning meetings held on Sunday 28 November, the small groups were
generally receptive to the idea being promoted by one prominent personality
that we undertake an action in a logging coupe. But when it was decided to
refer planning of the details of the action to the Strategy Collective plus
'interested others', it quickly became evident that 'others' were not really
welcome. This was my own personal experience. Breaking into the Strategy
Collective for such a meeting took a great deal of confidence which many (and
especially new) people did not have. One obvious outcome of this process was
that relatively experienced people (who were more ready for 'strong' action)
planned the action. As the Strategy and Media Collectives found out that
night when the action was watered down considerably, they were badly out of
step with feeling in the Camp generally because the planning process had not
included adequate representation from those people in the Camp with genuine
fears.

There are several things which could be done so that this type of problem is
not repeated, particularly when there are many new activists present. 1.
Allow more time for (and arrange to conduct more) workshops in which people
can discuss their anxieties and fears. 2. Allow more time for (and arrange to
conduct more) workshops in which people can discuss their conceptions of
conflict and nonviolence. In this way, people will quickly learn that it is
not conflict or confrontation which is bad per se. They will learn that
conflict and confrontation are inevitable and that it is how they are
conducted that matters. 3. Deliberately involve some new people - who
represent the bulk of 'ordinary' people in the Camp - in any action planning
or other meetings. In this way, the concerns of this large group will be more
fully taken into account during the planning process.

Thirdly, the members of the Strategy Collective were not considered
accessible. Apart from suggestions made at the Camp (for example, that
members wear an armband), another suggestion is that the main coordinators of
campaigns such as this organise a regular 'listening forum' in which they all
sit up front (so that people learn to identify them) while people at the Camp
air their views about the Camp and its processes.

Process within the strategy collective
It was evident to me from my listening and observation that there was no
adequately developed process by which the Strategy Collective could nurture
its members emotionally, spiritually and physically or deal with serious
conflict within the group. The first problem was evident in the workload
undertaken by several members of the Strategy Collective (and was related to
its inability to find meaningful ways of involving new people). The second
problem was evident from the different conceptions of strategy held by
members of the group. Both of these problems concerned me because I have seen
too many activists burn out and too many activist groups disintegrate. For
example, it is very obvious that there are few activists in this campaign who
were also involved in the East Gippsland campaign conducted in 1989-1990. How
many of these activists will be back next year or the year after? And how
many new activists will emerge to run these campaigns who, because of their
inexperience, will repeat many of the same mistakes?

The only solution to this problem is for organisers of campaigns to recognise
that nurturing themselves emotionally, spiritually and physically is a
primary responsibility and that processes for dealing with internal conflict
are imperative if any group is to survive as a dynamic force.

Conceptions of nonviolence and strategy
Within the Strategy Collective, members obviously subscribed to different
conceptions of nonviolence (and whether or not members identified with or
even liked this word, the EGFA campaign is essentially a nonviolent action
campaign) and strategy. The former difference was clearly evident in the
divergent views - among the major organisational members of the Alliance -
regarding the value of undertaking worker/industry liaison and in the
'debate' over the use of secrecy in actions. The latter difference was
evident in the tension between planning actions which empowered the activists
involved or which appealed to the media (not always mutually exclusive); it
was also evident in the tension between planning actions which relied on
grassroots action for change or which relied on elite reform (in this case, a
Federal Government decision in relation to the renewal of export woodchip
licences).

In any case, the lack of coherence in these regards was seriously interfering
with the capacity of this campaign to achieve its stated political
objectives. There is not space here to elaborate the many problems this
generates but I will identify three.

1. Although the EGFA has a list of thirteen political objectives (what you
want: 'To stop export woodchipping' etc.), it has not identified its
strategic aims and strategic goals (how you get what you want). This means
that the entire campaign lacks strategic guidance. Unfortunately, this
shortcoming is evident in most nonviolent campaigns including some of the
more prominent ones; it is a vital weakness of the Palestinian Intifada.

2. By not having a clear and widely accepted conception of nonviolence to
guide the EGFA strategy (partly, no doubt, because of concerns over the
'division' this might generate) the campaign is guided by a vague (or perhaps
'lowest common denominator') conception of nonviolence. This means that the
strategic implications of many behaviours are not considered: another problem
common to many campaigns. If the conception of nonviolence which will be
utilised in any campaign is actively debated and then resolved, there is more
opportunity for activists to make clearer choices about many things -
including the identity of those groups with which they will (or won't) form
an alliance and the suitability of particular tactics.

3. By not distinguishing between the tactical and strategic value of
obstructing work in a coupe, too much emphasis has been placed on impeding
work in one section of the forest rather than the more important political
objective of halting all woodchipping. At one stage I overheard one
experienced activist from north-east New South Wales observe that, with
logging going on in more than twenty coupes in East Gippsland and the limited
number of people in Base Camp, it is not possible to physically stop logging
(irrespective of the number of tripods built or other tactics employed). And,
of course, from the viewpoint of nonviolent strategy, the objective is not to
halt logging physically but to do so politically. This raises the central
strategic question of how to best do this. It also raises important secondary
questions like how much time - very little in most cases - should activists
involved in forest campaigns actually spend in the forest? Whatever the
campaign, there are several strategic considerations which should guide the
selection and implementation of nonviolent tactics.

In essence, if a campaign is to have a sound strategic orientation, it
requires a shared conception of nonviolence and a framework for developing
its strategy. For campaigns of the type discussed in this article, this will
normally require several days of intensive work (in an environment designed
specifically for the purpose) at the beginning of the campaign and then
additional time throughout it. Given its central importance in any campaign,
the time spent developing strategy is an essential investment.
Robert J Burrowes